Moscow Began Preparing for Georgian War Four Years Ago

general attack on the West and the West's democratic, free market, and
security ideas in the post-Soviet states, according to former Putin
economics advisor and more recently Kremlin critic Andrei Illarionov.

In a speech delivered to the Cato Institute in Ukraine on
September 4 but posted online only this week, Illarionov described what
Moscow's political leaders had said about Georgia over that period and what
Russian intelligence services had done against Georgia well before the first
of August (abkhazeti.info/news/1222739236.php).

And he described precisely what Russian forces had been doing in
the weeks leading up to the outbreak of hostilities and what they did after
that time, actions that in both cases show just how false are all Russian
claims that Tbilisi started the war and that Moscow intervened to defend its
citizens or the right of nations to self-determination.

If one examines this history, Illarionov said, then it becomes
clear why Moscow went to war against Georgia and why it is so critical that
everyone understand that "the Russian-Georgian war is part of another, very
major war that Russia intends to launch as a responsive strike to the West."

After disposing of Russia's "propaganda" arguments about its invasion of
Georgia - the defense of Russian citizens, the right of nations to
self-determination, and the supposed Georgian genocide of Ossetians -
Illarionov focused on two things: the reasons Moscow decided to move
against Georgia after the "rose" revolution and the specific steps it took.

According to Illarionov, the reasons for the Russian-Georgian war are to be
found in Moscow's reaction to the changes Georgia has undertaken in the last
four years and to Mikhail Saakashvili's success in restoring Tbilisi's
control over the Ajar region which had more often looked to Russia than to
Georgia.

Over the last four years, Illarionov said, "a contemporary, European,
democratic state, responsible to the population, has been created." And he
added that as a specialist on economic reform, he was prepared to assert
that there has not been any other country in the world which "has carried
out so many reforms in such a short time."

Those reforms, the former Kremlin advisor said, made it possible for Mikhail
Saakashvili to turn from Moscow to the West and to indicate that he wanted
his country to become a member of NATO and other Western institutions. Such
goals were unacceptable to the Russian leadership, and consequently, it set
as its "task" the removal of Saakashvili.

After the Georgian president "resolved" the Ajar problem, Moscow "began to
think" about replacing him. In December 2005, the Kremlin ordered the heads
of Russian energy companies to begin a blockade of Georgia, but when that
effort failed, the Russian government turned to other means.

Several pipelines and electric power lines passing from Russia
to Georgia were blown up, actions that many blamed on Islamic terrorists but
which, Illarionov said, investigations showed were in fact the work of
Russian special services. And "after that, there was an attempt at the
liquidation of the leader of the [Georgian] opposition," presumably by the
same agencies.

In 2006, the Georgian special services arrested several Russian
agencies but, Illarionov noted, "Georgia followed diplomatic etiquette and
without any noise sent them back to Moscow." Moscow stepped up its
penetration efforts, and in September, Tbilisi announced the arrest of four
Russian agents, and Moscow responded with an economic blockade.

Over the same period, Russia "strengthened its military presence
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia," and Russia diplomats told their colleagues
quite openly that Moscow would engage in military actions in Georgia before
September 2008, statements that many were inclined to dismiss but that
proved to be quite true.

And then Illarionov details the specific steps from July through
mid-August that show that Russia was planning to move well before
Saakashvili transferred his forces into South Ossetia, the action that the
Russian government continues to insist was the proximate cause of the war.

Most of the details he provided about that period have been
reported in the Western media, although they, like Illarionov's speech in
Kyiv itself, have not been given much attention in the mainstream Russian
media. (On that failure, see the discussion of Illarionov's remarks at

www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2008/09/30/61325.shtml.)

But the former Kremlin advisor's conclusion is if not new at
least more clearly articulated than those which have been offered by most
others. He pointed out that Russia continues to want a change of leadership
in Tbilisi because for the Kremlin, "the western choice of Georgia is
unacceptable."

Consequently, Illarionov said, Moscow's war against Western
influence in the post-Soviet states and hence against the West itself has
just begun. From the Kremlin's perspective, Georgia was the weak link, a
place where unlike in the Baltic countries or even Ukraine, it could act.

But because it did not achieve its goal in Georgia, Moscow will
continue to push there and elsewhere because Illarionov suggests, the
Russian leadership knows that if the Western combination of democracy and
free markets succeed in these countries, not only will Russia's influence
there decline but the power of Russia's current leaders will be at risk as
well.